Case Note: Securities Law - Pensions - An Involuntary Noncontributory Employee Pension Fund is a  Security  Under the Federal Securities Laws by Kurshan, Peter J.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 5 | Number 3 Article 12
1977
Case Note: Securities Law - Pensions - An
Involuntary Noncontributory Employee Pension
Fund is a "Security" Under the Federal Securities
Laws
Peter J. Kurshan
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter J. Kurshan, Case Note: Securities Law - Pensions - An Involuntary Noncontributory Employee Pension Fund is a "Security" Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 591 (1977).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol5/iss3/12
SECURITIES LAW-Pensions-An Involuntary Noncontribu-
tory Employee Pension Fund is a "Security" Under the Federal
Securities Laws. Daniel v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976), appeal docketed, No.
76-1855 (7th Cir. April 29, 1976).
Plaintiff union member John Daniel was denied the right to re-
ceive union pension benefits after working for twenty-two and one-
half years.' The trustees of the Local 705 Fund denied the benefits'
because Daniel's employment was not continuous. 3 They contended
that Daniel did not meet the conditions of the union pension plan,
since he had been laid off involuntarily for several months.' As a
result, Daniel brought a class action under the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws' on behalf of all present and past
Teamster members against the trustees of Local 705 pension plan,
Local 705, certain Local officers and the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters. Daniel alleged that defendants had violated section
17a of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)' and section 10b
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),7 in the offer
1. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 76-1855 (7th Cir. April 29, 1976).
2. Id. at 543.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The specific statutes are the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970)
'[hereinafter cited as the Securities Act]; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-j (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means . . . or by the use of the mails, . . . to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or . . . to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact . . . or . . . to engage in any transaction, practice or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud . ...
A private right of action exists under this section. See Dyer v. Eastern Tr. & Banking Co.,
336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1970). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe ... for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) promulgated thereunder provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, . . . to make any untrue statement of a mate-
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
and sale of interests in their pension fund.
Daniel alleged that defendants had misrepresented the length
and continuity requirements of the plan, and failed to disclose cer-
tain material facts concerning those requirements.' Additionally, he
contended that as a result of these misrepresentations he acquired
and subsequently maintained a "security" interest in the pension
fund.' Contrary to his expectations, he did not receive any retire-
ment benefits for the money paid into the pension fund on his be-
half."
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds.
First, they contended that Congress viewed the federal securities
laws as inapplicable to interests in pension funds since there is other
legislation designed to deal with such interests." Second,
defendants argued that a stake in a pension plan is not a security
and noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
consistently ruled that no sale of a security is involved in the opera-
tion of an involuntary, noncontributory employee pension fund. 2
Finally, defendants claimed that plaintiff's action was barred by the
statute of limitations because he had admitted that the misrepre-
rial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or . . . to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud ... in connection with the purchase of sale of any security.
8. 410 F. Supp at 546. A case decided after Daniel in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that employees could not recover on the ground
that the employer was unjustly enriched when'their rights under a noncontributory, salaried
pension plan were forfeited. The court did not mention Daniel or the federal securities laws.
Hardy v. H.K. Porter Co. Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
9. 410 F. Supp. at 545-46.
10. Id. at 544-45. For a discussion of damages in a private action under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, see Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Ac-
tions Under Rule )Ob-5, 1968 WASH. U. L. Q. 165.
11. 410 F. Supp. at 547. The legislation referred to by the defendants is the Employees
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V, 1975).
12. 410 F. Supp. at 546. The SEC has taken the position that the offer or sale of certain
types of voluntary, contributory plans are subject to the registration and prospectus require-
ments of the Securities Act. Although the SEC reserves opinion on a plan until a copy of it
has been filed, the Commission's view is that no "offer" or "sale" under section 2(3) of the
Securities Act is involved "in the case of noncontributory plan, . . . or in the case of a
compulsory plan, where there is no element of volition on the part of employees whether or
not to participate and make contributions." Opinion of Assistant General Counsel of Com-
mission, [19411 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2105.53.
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sentations began as early as 1955, and continued from that time.'3
The district court in Daniel v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters" agreed with plaintiff that an investment in a pension
fund constitutes the sale of a security as defined by the securities
laws,'5 and that a private cause of action can be successfully liti-
gated under the antifraud provisions of those laws.'" The court con-
ceded that the securities laws provide no explicit answer to whether
involuntary and noncontributory pension plans involve the sale of
a security," but it found no statutory language prohibiting the ap-
plication of these laws to pension funds.'8
The term "security" is defined in the Securities Act as including
''any ... certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing
agreement . . . investment contract . . . or . . . any interest . . .
commonly known as a 'security'."' 9 Historically, the SEC has con-
13. 410 F. Supp. at 544. The issue involving the tolling of the statute of limitations
requires the court to determine when plaintiff should have been aware of the misrepresen-
tation in the plan (i.e., when should a reasonable man have discovered the facts?). Fischman
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1951).
In Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit
held that the state blue-sky law's limiting period (three years) rather than the general statute
of limitations for fraud (five years) should apply in a Rule 10b-5 action. Id. at 126. The court
also noted that the law of Illinois, the forum state in Parrent and Daniel, gives the buyer of
a security a right of rescission for conduct prohibited by the antifraud provisions. Id. at 125.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137.13 (Supp. 1977). See also Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708
(7th Cir. 1975).
In Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967), the Sixth Circuit found that the six
year statute of limitations for fraud was applicable because there was no state provision
similar to that of Rule 10b-5.
14. 410 F. Supp. at 541.
15. Id. at 552-53.
16. Id. In addition to proving that the transaction involves the sale of a security, the
federal securities laws require a plaintiff to establish a connection between his loss and the
defendant's fraudulent conduct. For a plaintiff to have standing under Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act, he must be an actual purchaser or seller. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue Chip denied relief to offerees dissuaded from buying and
stockholders persuaded to retain their stock. Id. at 754-55. In contrast, an employee who
retains his job makes a decision which results in his continuing to give value for an increased
interest in the pension plan.
In addition to meeting the test outlined in Blue Chip, a plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 suit must
prove scienter on the part of the defendant. Negligence alone will not suffice. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976). For further discussion, see Foremost-McKesson,
Inc., v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 249-51 nn.24 & 26 (1976).
17. 410 F. Supp. at 552.
18. Id. at 549. But cf. Weins v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, [1977] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal. March 28, 1977).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1970). The definition of a security in the Exchange Act is substan-
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cluded that Congress did not intend to bring involuntary and non-
contributory pension funds within the ambit of the securities laws.2
Moreover, agencies such as the Department of Labor have tradition-
ally regulated the operation of pension funds.'
The Supreme Court first attempted to interpret the term
"security" in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp."2 Defendant oil
promoter formed a corporation which acquired oil and gas lease-
holds and then sold them to investors. 3 The lower court concluded
that these acts did not involve the sale of a security, making the
Securities Act inapplicable to the transactions. 4 The Supreme
Court disagreed, concluding that the defendants were selling invest-
ment contracts. 5
Rather than promulgating broad criteria for determining the pres-
ence of an investment contract, the Joiner Court confined its analy-
sis to the facts of the case at bar. 6 But Mr. Justice Jackson, writing
for the Court, cautioned that the "reach of the [Securities] Act
does not stop with the obvious and the commonplace. Novel, un-
common, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which estab-
lished their character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as
'any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security" ,.,,7
Three years later in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,"8 the Supreme Court
again interpreted the terms "security" and "investment contract."
Defendant Howey Company sold citrus grove plots to the public in
order to acquire capital for additional development. The buyers
were attracted to the groves by the expectation of substantial prof-
its.21 These buyers were generally out-of-state business and profes-
tially the same. id. § 78c(a)(10). For an analysis of the word "security," see Coffey, The
Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L.
REv. 367 (1967).
20. 410 F. Supp. at 546. See also note 12 supra.
21. 410 F. Supp. at 547.
22. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
23. Id. at 346-48.
24. 133 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
25. 320 U.S. at 351.
26. Id. at 355.
27. Id. at 351.
28. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
29. Id. at 296.
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sional people who lacked the knowledge, skill and equipment neces-
sary for the care and cultivation of citrus trees. Defendant Howey-
in-the-Hills Service Corporation, a subsidiary under the same man-
agement as defendant, serviced the groves under separate contracts.
While the buyers were free to make arrangements with other service
companies, defendant vigorously marketed the services of its sub-
sidiary; and many executed service contracts with Howey-in-the-
Hills.'"
The Court found that these contracts, considered together, consti-
tuted an investment contract within the meaning of section 2(1) of
the Securities Act.3 1 Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court,
stated that "an investment contract ... means a contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party . ... ,3
The most troublesome element of the Howey test is the require-
ment that profits come solely from the efforts of a promoter or third
party.3 3 Through a strict interpretation of this element, the Howey
Company could have avoided the problems presented by the federal
securities laws if it had asked the investors to pick one piece of
fruit.34 But Mr. Justice Murphy concluded the Howey opinion by
stating that the "statutory policy for affording broad protection to
investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formu-
lae. ' 35 Moreover, several circuits have refused to read Howey so
literally and have found that minimal investor participation will not
prevent the application of the securities law.36
30. Id. at 294-96.
31. Id. at 300; 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1970).
32. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
33. Id. at 299.
34. Id. See Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135, 140 (1971).
35. 328 U.S. at 301.
36. In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Ent. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d
476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the invest-
ment contract concept is a flexible one. It disregarded the form of the transaction for its
substance to find that defendant's "pyramid scheme" was an investment contract. 474 F.2d
at 481. The scheme involved the payment of a fixed sum of money by the purchaser, in return
for which he would attend classes aimed at improving his self-motivation and sales ability.
After making several purchases, the investor was allowed to sell self-improvement courses to
others. From their payments, he received a commission. See 348 F. Supp. at 775.
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The Supreme Court continued to expand the scope of the Securi-
ties Act in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. of America
(VALIC),37 where it concluded that variable annuities were subject
to the registration provisions of the Securities Act.3 The Court
found a security to exist because a variable annuity places all of the
investment risks on the annuitant, and none on the company.39 It
compared an annuity with an insurance contract where the com-
pany assumes all the investment risks, and stated that insurance
contracts are not securities. 0 The Court found the Securities Act
applicable even though such annuity schemes were concurrently
subject to state regulation.4
In Tcherepnin v. Knight, 2 the Supreme Court held that holders
of withdrawable capital shares 3 in an Illinois Savings and Loan
Association were participants in a plan which involved the sale of a
security under the Exchange Act." Several purchasers of these
shares brought a class action seeking rescission because of false and
misleading statements made in the Savings and Loan Association's
The Commission sought injunctive relief against defendant's pyramid scheme alleging that
the investment was the sale of a security. The district court agreed, but cited no precedent.
Id. at 773-76. The court of appeals adopted a controlling efforts analysis to show that the
investors did not exercise managerial authority sufficient to affect the failure or success of
the enterprise. 474 F.2d at 482. The specialized, high-powered tactics used by the promoters
in the scheme indicated the existence of a security. Id. For a discussion of Turner and the
court's analysis therein, see Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to be Regulated, 61 GEo. L. J.
1257, 1279 (1973). See, e.g., Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co. Inc., 487
F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
37. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
38. Id. at 73.
39. Id. at 71-73.
40. Id. at 69, 73 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
387 U.S. 202 (1967).
41. 359 U.S. at 69.
42. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
43. Withdrawable capital shares are a method of raising capital which is authorized by
Illinois statute. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 761(a) (1970). A person becomes a holder of a with-
drawable capital share after depositing money in an account at a savings and loan association.
For each one hundred dollars of aggregate withdrawal value in the account, the investor is
entitled to one voting share. There is no fixed rate of return, and dividends are declared by
the board of directors based upon the association's profits. While withdrawable capital shares
are non-negotiable, they can be transferred by written assignment accompanied by the appro-
priate certificate or account book. 389 U.S. at 337.
44. Id. at 338.
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solicitation material. 45 That material portrayed the Association as
a viable financial institution; however, it followed unsafe financial
policies, 4 and was managed by individuals convicted of mail fraud.
Defendants, because there was a sale of a security, were held liable
under the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.4 In
Tcherepnin, as in VALIC, the Supreme Court found the federal
securities laws applicable even though a state agency had concur-
rent jurisdiction. 48
Recently, in United Housing Foundation v. Forman,'4 tenants of
a low income housing cooperative alleged that defendant coopera-
tive violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act by misrepresenting that future and substantial rent
increases would be absorbed by the project developers."0 The Court
found that the tenants' "shares" in the cooperative were not securi-
ties.",
In Forman, the tenants had acquired an interest in a residential
apartment for personal use rather than as an investment. The Court
stated it would be difficult to conclude that the tenants were pur-
chasing investment securities" where the interest acquired was a
living accommodation. 3 Accordingly, the tenants' shares of stock
lacked what was described as the most common feature of stock in
Tcherepnin, i.e., the right to receive "dividends contingent upon an
apportionment of profits."5 The Court also noted that the tenants'
stock did not have other characteristics associated with securities,
such as negotiability, voting rights in proportion to the number of
shares owned, and the ability to appreciate in value.5"
45. Id. at 334.
46. There is no listing of the unsafe financial policies in the case, but because of these
policies the Savings and Loan Association was denied federal insurance. Id.
47. 389 U.S. at 345.
48. Id. at 337-38.
49. 421 U.S. 837, rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
50. 421 U.S. at 844.
51. Id. at 846-48.
52. Id. at 854. The deciding factor seems to be substance rather than form as the Court
applied an "intent-revealed-in-context approach as against a literal-text-reading ...."
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc., v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1356 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. 421 U.S. at 854.
54. 389 U.S. at 339.
55. 421 U.S. at 851. The Court also noted the absence of any indication that a return of
capital would be forthcoming after the surrender of the pr~mises. Id. at 854.
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According to the Supreme Court, any investment which moti-
vates investors to risk capital by a realistic expectation of profits can
be a security." The Court in Howey, Joiner and Forman looked at
the economic realities underlying the transaction and not the name
appended thereto in determining what constitutes a security.
The Daniel court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that his
interest in the Local 705 Pension Fund was an investment contract
within the meaning of the securities laws. In Daniel, money was
invested in a common enterprise, management of the plan was com-
mitted to a third party and the participants in the plan expected
profits in the form of retirement benefits? Furthermore, the court
found that the Local 705 trustees had the sole power of control over
the common enterprise and the investment of all assets contained
therein. Thus, the management of the investments was indeed com-
mitted to a third party."
For the transaction in Daniel to be covered by the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws, it was also necessary to find a
sale of the security. Because the Securities Act defines a sale as
"every . . . disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value,'"19 it was necessary for the Daniel court to determine whether
the interests in the Local 705 plan were disposed of for value."
The SEC has taken the position that the registration provisions
of the Securities Act do not apply to transactions involving noncon-
tributory, involuntary pension plans." It has reasoned that employ-
ees involved in such plans receive their security interests as a gift
and not for value; thus, there is no sale, nor is there any investment
In the Forman dissent written by Mr. Justice Brennan, and joined by Mr. Justices Douglas
and White, the view was posited that the tenants had invested money in the cooperative so
that management would be as efficient as possible in its operations, the end result being
reduced charges to the tenants. Id. at 861-62. This is probably the most liberal interpretation
given to the word "security" by any member of the Court.
56. Id. at 854-55.
57. 410 F. Supp. at 550-52.
58. Id. at 551.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)(1970). The definition of "sale" in the Exchange Act "include[s]
any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Id. § 78c(a)(14).
60. 410 F. Supp. at 552-53.
61. Testimony of Commission Chairman Cohen when Congress was considering an
amendment to exempt certain types of pensions from registration under the Securities Act.
Hearings on Amendment No. 435 to S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1326 (1967).
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decision." Because the purpose of the Securities Act is to disclose
to prospective investors essential facts concerning the security to be
purchased, those who receive a security as a gift would not benefit
from the application of the Act. "3
The Daniel court noted that employer pension plan contributions
are recognized as part of an employee's wages. 4 It found that contri-
butions of these wages constituted the employee's giving of value. "5
Economically, there is no difference between the facts in Daniel
where the employer made the contribution directly to the fund, and
the situation where an employee first receives the employer contri-
bution as part of his wages and then pays it to the fund." Moreover,
the employee's services on the job can be viewed as consideration
for the employer's contribution to the fund.
Daniel was not the first court to hold that the performance of
services constitutes value, though it was the first court to do so with
regard to a pension plan. In Collins v. Rukin,7 defendant corporate
president made an offer of employment to plaintiff. In additon to
his salary, plaintiff was given the opportunity to participate in a
stock purchase plan;6" but instead of having to make cash payments
for the stock, plaintiff could make his contribution in the form of
services. After accepting the offer of employment, plaintiff re-
signed and brought suit for a violation of the antifraud provisions
62. Id. The Daniel court disagreed with this position and concluded'that employees par-
ticipating in a pension fund do so on a voluntary basis. 410 F. Supp. at 553. It noted that the
decision to accept or reject a wage package was a voluntary one because the employees could
vote against an increased portion of their wages going towards the pension fund. Id.
63. 116 CONG. REC. 40608 (1970).
64. In support of its conclusion the court cited Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
quoted a NLRB order which stated that the term wages in the National Labor Relations Act
"must be construed to includeemoluments of value, like pension and insurance benefits,
which may accrue to employees out of their employment relationship . . . .Realistically
viewed, this type of wage enhancement ...becomes an integral part of the entire wage
structure. ... 170 F.2d at 251. The Supreme Court followed the holding in Inland Steel
twelve years later where it found employee contributions to a pension fund to be "really
another form of compensation. "Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 469 (1960).
65. 410 F. Supp. at 552-53.
66. Id. at 553.
67. 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972).
68. Id. at 1284. The court said that a stock purchase plan could be considered a security.
Id. at 1286-87.
69. Id. at 1289.
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of the securities laws.7 Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
stating that there was no sale of a security.7' The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion,
and found that the plaintiff's performance of services satisfied the
value requirements of a sale.7"
Although there have been decisions granting relief for the denial
of pension benefits,73 Daniel is the only case to conclude that mem-
bership in a pension fund involves the sale of a security. In recent
"no-action" letters, the SEC staff has opined that employee stock
plans involve a sale where there is an election by the employee to
participate in the plan.74 The Commission also has promulgated
regulations defining a private retirement plan managed by a bank
as a security, but only if there is an investment decision on the part
of the participant.75
The courts have also looked to the element of volition in deter-
mining the existence of a sale under the securities laws.7" In Daniel,
the court found that bargained for employer contributions to the
pension plan represented monies which could have been used for
wages." Thus, an investment decision was made as to the use of a
portion of the wage package.
Although the securities laws provide an adequate remedy for
fraudulent and manipulative acts in the sale of a security, defen-
70. Id. at 1284-85.
71. Id. at 1285.
72. Id. at 1289-91. See also SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Tex. 1961). In Addison
the court held that profit-sharing agreements between defendants and suppliers of services
were investment contracts, and thus securities. The giving of certificates of interest in the
profit-sharing agreement as consideration of services rendered constituted a sale. Id. at 722.
73. Meehan v. Laborers Pension Fund, 418 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. I1. 1976); Lucas v. Seagrave
Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
74. Guaranty Corp., [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,709 (October 8, 1976).
75. Independent Bankers' Ass'n, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
79,198 (January 8, 1973). In addition, former Chairman of the Commission Cohen testified
that an employee acquiring an interest in a pension fund is making an investment decision
to put into a fund "that which he would otherwise get in his paycheck." Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Labor, Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
231 (1972).
76. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 389
U.S. 977 (1967); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Inland Steel v. NLRB, 170. F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972).
77. 410 F. Supp. at 552-53.
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dants in Daniel cited the enactment of the Employees Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)78 as indicating a congressional intent
that the federal securities laws are inapplicable to pension plans.
The court disagreed. It found that the intent of ERISA was to pro-
vide for the ongoing administration of pension plans and not the
initial sale of the interest.79 In SEC v. Garfinkle,0 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York reached a
similar conclusion, holding that the enactment of ERISA was de-
signed to complement rather than displace SEC authority."' In
Garfinkle,82 the court found a welfare fund director guilty of fraud
when he arranged for the purchase of worthless or near worthless
junior mortgages by his welfare fund.83 The director received
kickbacks for these arrangements, and because of their purchase the
welfare fund suffered considerable financial losses.
The Garfinkle court held that the SEC is not divested of jurisdic-
tion, even though the New York State Department of Insurance
supervised and regulated the union welfare fund involved. 4 Nor,
said the court, is the SEC precluded from acting because of the
enactment of ERISA which gives the Secretary of Labor the power
to regulate welfare funds. 5
Prior to the passage of ERISA an employee or participant in a
pension plan who was entitled to fair and equitable treatment may
have been deprived of his earned benefits because his employer
could terminate the benefit plan.86 Some courts enforced the spirit
of the benefit agreement, but large numbers of employees have lost
their pensions because a court would not imply rights not expressly
conferred by the plan itself.8 7
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V, 1975) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
79. 410 F. Supp. at 548. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(Supp. V, 1975).
80. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,020 (S.D.N.Y. March 18,
1975).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)(Supp. V, 1975).
86. Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1958).
87. Local 2040, Machinists v. Servel Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959); Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958). See
generally Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants.Shut Down: Problems and Some
Proposals, 76 HAav. L. Rav. 952 (1963).
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Following a comprehensive study, Congress concluded that fed-
eral statutes which purported to control the area of pension fund
reporting and disclosure were inadequate." The Internal Revenue
Service had the power to grant or disallow tax exemptions to plans,"8
but this supervision provided only limited control over benefits.
The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA),9 the
predecessor of ERISA, proved inadequate because it contained no
enforcement powers.' In additon, WPPDA lacked fiduciary stan-
dards and placed upon the participant the duty to monitor his
plan. The Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA)I2 provided
protection for employees in plans administered jointly by employ-
ers and unions. 3 It imposed penalties for the fraudulent structure
of trusts and required that the plan be for the "sole and exclusive
benefit of [the] employee . . . ."" But the LMRA did not provide
for vesting standards, funding adequacy, nor sufficient standards of
fiduciary conduct. 5
ERISA established standards for vesting,9" funding adequacy, 7
portability of credits earned at other jobs,9" and standards of fidu-
ciary conduct.9 Also, ERISA now requires insurance to provide fi-
nancial soundness to a plan. 09
88. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, INTERIM REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE
PRIVATE WELFARE AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, S. REP. No. 634, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75 (1972).
89. I.R.C. § 401.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1970), repealed by 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (Supp. V, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as WPPDA1.
91. See note 87 supra.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 141-88 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
93. Id.
94. Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (N.D. II. 1971).
95. Id. at 1231.
96. ERISA provides that the employer may choose from three alternative plans. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(2)(Supp. V, 1975). First, credits accrue to the employee, and after ten years of
service his rights are fully vested. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(A). Second, 25 percent of an employee's
rights vest after five years of service. In the next five years his rights vest 5 percent each year,
and in the following five years his rights vest 10 percent each year. After fifteen years, he is
fully vested. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(B). Third, the employee is 50 percent vested when the sum of
his age and years of service equal forty-five, providing he has at least five years of service.
Id. § 1053(a)(2)(C)(i). In the next ten years his rights vest in increments of 10 percent every
other year. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(C)(ii). When the sum of his age and years of service equal fifty-
five, he is fully vested. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(C)(i).
97. Id. 33 1081-86.
98. Id. § 1051-61.
99. Id. § 1101-14.
100. Id. § 1323.
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ERISA is important in cases such as Daniel because of the need
for proper disclosure of the contents of a pension plan. The duty of
fair disclosure and reporting under ERISA entitles those who have
joined a pension plan to receive an annual report and plan descrip-
tion. In addition, the participant is entitled to a statement of his
accrued benefits and earned non-forfeitable rights. Disclosure,
under ERISA, is a means of communicating sufficient information
to participants to enable them to make intelligent decisions based
on this information.""1 Nevertheless, as the Daniel court held,
"Congress has not demonstrated ... any intent to make securities
laws inapplicable to employee pension funds."'12
Employee pension plans play a significant if not determinative
role in the employee's decision whether to take or maintain a job.
When an employee is induced by fraudulent and material misrepre-
sentations to enter into and maintain his position in a pension plan
by continual payments, a denial of his right of recovery under estab-
lished theories of securities law would be in contravention of equi-
table principles.
Courts have recognized that the sale of a security takes place
when there is an investment of value. No longer does the form of the
investment play a determinative role, because courts now look to
the underlying economic realities.
Peter J. Kurshan
101. Id. § 1001(b).
102. 410 F. Supp. at 549.
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